

# NSC-JST workshop


Secure Decentralized Erasure Code based  
Networked Storage Systems with Multiple  
Functionalities

Wen-Guey Tzeng 曾文貴

(joint work with Hsiao-Ying Lin)

National Chiao Tung University

# Distributed Networked Storage




Servers are decentralized:  
no single central authority

# Objectives


- ❖ Data robustness
  - ❖ Storage servers may fail over time (erasure error)
- ❖ Data confidentiality
  - ❖ The managers of storage servers may not be honest
- ❖ Functionalities
  - ❖ Data forwarding
  - ❖ System repairing
  - ❖ Integrity check
  - ❖ Keyword search
  - ❖ ...

# Data Robustness


## ◆ Simple replication



- Expensive in storage space
- Solution: decentralized erasure code




# Erasure Code



# Decentralized Erasure Code

## Decentralized encoding

- each codeword symbol is **independently** computed
- linear combination with random coefficients




$$G = \begin{bmatrix} a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & \dots & a_{1,k} \\ a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & \dots & a_{2,k} \\ a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & \dots & a_{3,k} \\ \dots & \dots & \dots & \dots \\ a_{n,1} & a_{n,2} & \dots & a_{n,k} \end{bmatrix} \quad [M_1 \quad M_2 \quad \dots \quad M_k] \bullet G^T = [C_1 \quad C_2 \quad \dots \quad C_n]$$

# Decentralized Erasure Code

## Decode

- solve a linear system with  $k$  equations and  $k$  unknowns




## When K is invertible

$$G = \begin{bmatrix} a_{1,1} & a_{1,2} & \cdots & a_{1,k} \\ a_{2,1} & a_{2,2} & \cdots & a_{2,k} \\ a_{3,1} & a_{3,2} & \cdots & \cdots \\ \cdots & \cdots & \cdots & \cdots \\ a_{n,1} & a_{n,2} & \cdots & a_{n,k} \end{bmatrix} \xrightarrow{\quad K = \begin{bmatrix} \text{k columns} \\ \vdots \\ \text{k rows} \end{bmatrix} \quad} \begin{bmatrix} M_1 \\ M_2 \\ \cdots \\ M_k \end{bmatrix}^T = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \\ \cdots \\ C_k \end{bmatrix}^T (K^T)^{-1}$$


$M_1$   $M_2$   $M_3$  ...  $M_k$

# Example



$$[M_1 \quad M_2] \circ \begin{bmatrix} a_{1,1} & a_{2,1} & 0 \\ 0 & a_{2,2} & a_{3,2} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$= [M_1^{a_{1,1}} \quad M_1^{a_{2,1}} M_2^{a_{2,2}} \quad M_2^{a_{3,2}}] = [c_1 \quad c_2 \quad c_3]$$



# Decentralized Erasure Code for Storage


- ❖ Decentralized encoding (in servers)
- ❖ Robust against erasure errors
- ❖ Efficient in storage
- ❖ Light confidentiality

# Previous Result

Assumption: random & independent distribution,


[2006] Result:  **$v=c \ln(k)$ , where  $c > 5 n/k$**

$$\Pr[\text{success retrieval}] > 1 - k/p - o(1)$$



# Decentralized Erasure Code for Storage

- ❖ Robust against erasure errors
- ❖ Decentralized encoding
- ❖ Efficient in storage
- ❖ Light confidentiality
- ❖ Stronger confidentiality is wanted
- ❖ More functionalities are desired
  - ❖ Data forwarding
  - ❖ System repairing
  - ❖ ...



# Security Concerns

- ❖ Storage in public
  - ❖ Confidentiality of stored data
  - ❖ Solution: cryptographic encryption scheme
- ❖ Key management (key server)
  - ❖ Store secret key at single point is risky
  - ❖ Solution: key servers in private cloud
    - ◆ secret sharing
    - ◆ key share holder performs partial decryption
    - ◆ user recovers messages from partial decrypted data

# Our work


- ❖ No central authority (decentralized)
- ❖ Data robustness Decentralized random linear code
- ❖ Strong confidentiality Homomorphic public-key encryption
- ❖ Secure data forwarding Proxy re-encryption
- ❖ Key management Partial decryption
- ❖ Repair mechanism Linear code repair

# Erasure coding over ciphertext


- ◆ Homomorphic encryption (multiplicative)

$$E_A(M_1) \otimes E_A(M_2) = E_A(M_1 M_2)$$

$$E_A(M_1)^a \otimes E_A(M_2)^b = E_A(M_1^a M_2^b)$$



# Proxy Re-encryption





- ❖ Required properties
  - ❖ Support decentralized/secure erasure coding
  - ❖ Support decentralized partial decryption
- ❖ We construct one satisfying all. It is
  - ❖ Based on bilinear map
  - ❖ Multiplicatively homomorphic

# Decentralized Partial Decryption

storage servers


 $E_A(M_1^{a_{1,1}}), a_{1,1}, 0$  $E_A(M_1^{a_{2,1}} \bullet M_2^{a_{2,2}}), a_{2,1}, a_{2,2}$  $E_A(M_2^{a_{3,2}}), 0, a_{3,2}$ 

key servers  
(with key shares)

 $M_1, M_2$


# System Overview

t-out-of-m secret sharing




# Storing Process

Coding over encrypted messages




# Forwarding Process

Compute and send re-encryption key




# Retrieval Process - Owner

Decentralized partial decryption




# Retrieval Process - Owner

Combine partial decryption and decoding



# Success Retrieval



## Conditions

1. #SSs chosen by KSs is at least  $k$
2.  $\det(\text{submatrix}) \neq 0 \pmod p \rightarrow \det(\text{submatrix}) \neq 0$   
 $\det(\text{submatrix}) \neq rp$

## Observations

- $\det(\text{submatrix}) \neq 0$  iff a perfect matching

## Parameters

For  $n = ak^c, m \geq t \geq k, a > \sqrt{2}, v = bk^{c-1} \ln k, c \geq 3/2$   
 $u = 2, b > 5a, \Pr[\text{success retrieval}] > 1 - k/p - o(1)$

By combinational bound:

$$\Pr[\#\text{SS} < k] \leq C_{k-1}^n (1/n)^{uk} = o(1)$$

By Hall's Theorem:


$$\Pr[\det = 0 \mid \#\text{SS} \geq k] = \Pr[\text{no perfect matching}] = o(1)$$

By Schwartz-Zippel Theorem (for random coefficients):

$$\Pr[\det = rp \text{ for some integer } r \mid \#\text{SS} \geq k, \det \neq 0] \leq k/p$$

# Repair Issue


Maintain data robustness against server failure



# Repair Mechanisms

- ❖ Straightforward solution:
  - ❖ Reconstruct the **original message** and encode it again
  - ❖ Need to query k old servers
- ❖ Another approach
  - ❖ Generate a **missing symbol** by combining **q** available symbols from old servers
  - ❖ Objective: less repair bandwidth and storage cost
  - ❖ Question: can q be less than k?

# Our Repair Mechanism




A new server **encodes** received symbols as one (new symbol)

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{a } C_3, (a_{3,1}, a_{3,2}, \dots, a_{3,k}) \\ \text{b } C_4, (a_{4,1}, a_{4,2}, \dots, a_{4,k}) \end{array} \right. \xrightarrow{\quad} C_3^a \otimes C_4^b, \\ (aa_{3,1} + ba_{4,1}, aa_{3,2} + ba_{4,2}, \dots, aa_{3,k} + ba_{4,k})$$

# About q

- When  $q$  is small, a new server gets less information  
 →  $K$  may not have full rank (not invertible)  
 → decrease  $\Pr[\text{successful message retrieval}]$



# Main Result

There are  $k^d$  old servers.  $(1-\alpha)n$  new servers join the system, where

$$n = ak^c, a > \sqrt{2}, c \geq 1, \alpha n = k^d, d > 1, \alpha < 1$$

Let  $q$  be set s.t.

$$q \geq \min\{k, \max\left\{\frac{2k}{(d-1)\ln k}, \frac{k}{(d-1)\ln k} + \frac{d}{d-1}\right\}\}$$

After the system is repaired,


$$\Pr[\text{successful message retrieval}] \geq 1 - \frac{2k}{p} - o(1)$$

“ $q$  can be less than  $k$ ”

The bound on  $q$  is related to  $k$  and  $d$

# Numerical Results

- Bring  $k$  and  $d$  to find the smallest  $q$



# Summary

- ❖ Decentralized networked storage system
  - ❖ Data robustness
  - ❖ Strong data confidentiality
  - ❖ Key management
  - ❖ Multiple functionalities
    - ◆ Secure data forwarding
    - ◆ Repair mechanism
    - ◆ Integrity check (not in this talk)

# Future Work

- ❖ Data robustness against faulty errors
  - ❖ Detect/correct when stored data are altered
  - ❖ Support efficient coding operations
- ❖ Different repair model
  - ❖ Mutual communication among new servers
- ❖ More functionality
  - ❖ Support decentralized integrity check
  - ❖ Support keyword search